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WIERENGA NO A-THEORIST EITHER
William Lane Craig

The defender of the coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and
a tensed theory of time may either argue that no incoherence has been shown
in the notion of a timeless being's knowing tensed facts or else provide an
account of divine omniscience according to which a deity who is ignorant of
tensed facts may still count as omniscient. With respect to the first strategy, I
took Wierenga to be arguing that in grasping present-time propositions
involving a time's haecceity God is able to know the tensed propositional content or facts expressed by tensed sentences, even though such grasping does
not in God's case issue in beliefs de praesenti. In his reply, Wierenga makes it
clear that in his first proposal he is not offering a defense of God's knowledge
of tensed facts at all, so that this proposed account does not even pretend to
offer an account of God's knowledge of tensed facts. With respect to the second strategy, Wierenga characterizes as misleading my description of his view
as allowing that there is a "multitude of objectively true propositions which
remain unknown to God" and that temporal persons "know not merely that p
is true at t; they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of which
God is ignorant." But if Wierenga's re-definition of omniscience is intended to
preclude propositions expressed by tensed sentences' being simply true, then
he will have preserved divine omniscience only at the expense of denying the
tensed theory of time. In that case, the second strategy proves no more successful in defending the coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience,
and a tensed theory of time than the first strategy.

Edward Wierenga is one of the most subtle and careful thinkers to have
tackled the various conundrums of divine omniscience, and I am grateful
for his reply to my critique of his defense of the coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory of time.! I want at the
outset to endorse heartily his fundamental claim that any adequate discussion of this subject must involve an account of what the objects of knowledge and belief are, as well as a statement of what is required for omniscience. I have elsewhere tried to survey the various proposals currently
on offer and have tried to show that on none of them can a timeless being
have knowledge of tensed facts and that therefore, given a tensed theory of
time, such a being does not qualify as omniscient or, at least, maximally
excellent cognitively.2
Now there are two broad strategies available to the defender of the
coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory
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of time: either to argue that no incoherence has been shown in the notion
of a timeless being's knowing tensed facts or else to provide an account of
divine omniscience or of the objects of knowledge according to which a
deity who is ignorant of tensed facts may still count as omniscient. I took
Wierenga to be pursuing both of these strategies.
With respect to the first strategy, I took Wierenga to be arguing that in
grasping present-time propositions involving a time's haecceity God is
able to know the tensed propositional content or facts expressed by tensed
sentences, even though such grasping does not in God's case issue in
beliefs de praesenti. I took it that for Wierenga a time's haecceity involved
the tense determination presentness, just as on his view a person's haecceity
involves the property being me. In his fourteenth footnote of his reply
Wierenga expresses confusion concerning the question of whether a time's
haecceity involves its tense. This question is, however, crucial in my opinion, and by it I mean, in effect, to ask whether the times whose haecceities
are under discussion are, in Wierenga's view, moments of an A-series or
moments of a B-series. Since the relations among times discussed by
Wierenga are tenseless B-relations, the haecceities must belong to times in
an A-series and include their respective A-determinations, if God is to possess knowledge of tensed facts in grasping propositions involving such
haecceities.
In reading Wierenga's reply, I now see that I was mistaken in interpreting him to be offering a defense of God's knowledge of tensed facts at all.
For now he clearly states that according to his account the propositional
content expressed by tensed sentences and known timelessly by God is, in
fact, tenseless: "Craig's summary of the view is accurate enough, except
that he represents me as holding that 'tense belongs to the propositional
content of tensed sentences, so that God must ... know tensed facts' (228).
I think instead that tense is a feature of language; the view under consideration says that tensed sentences express eternal (tenseless) propositions."
This view is the standard B-Theory of Language. Wierenga writes,
' ... it turns out that what God knows are wholly tenseless propositions, not present-time propositions.' Craig goes on to suggest a way
in which I 'could escape this conclusion.' However, since that is the
conclusion for which I was arguing, I have no desire to escape it. Craig
identifies a feature of the proposal, not a flaw: although we know different propositions at different times, those propositions are eternally
true, and God can thus know them without being himself in time.
Wierenga thus affirms that his temporal haecceities do not include a time's
tense determination, so that God's knowledge is restricted to tenseless
facts. Hence, we may simply set to the side the (admittedly interesting)
discussion of the alleged deficits and defenses of this proposed account/
since it does not even pretend to offer an account of God's knowledge of
tensed facts.
The upshot is that the whole weight of the defense of the coherence of
divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory of time falls
on the second strategy. I indicted Wierenga's account as an unacceptably
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ad hoc revision of the traditional definition of omniscience because the
ostensibly perspectival nature of truth is not a sufficient condition for
exempting knowledge of a certain class of propositions from the concept of
omniscience. On Wierenga's definition a being could count as omniscient
even though he is ignorant of an infinite number of true propositions ..
This is just not what we ordinarily mean by "omniscience."
Wierenga's main responses to this objection is intriguing and revealing:
... it is somewhat misleading to describe the view as allowing that
there is a 'multitude of objectively true propositions which remain
unknown to God' and that temporal persons 'know not merely that p
is true at t; they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of
which God is ignorant.' For the perspectival propositions which God
does not know are not really true simpliciter but only relative to or at
some index or other.
In rejecting these characterizations of his view, Wierenga has, in effect,
abandoned a tensed theory of time.
For on a tensed theory of time there is a time which is uniquely and
objectively present. Therefore, propositions which are true at some time t
but false at some other time t' are simply true when t is present. It is the
tenseless theory of time which trades in truth simpliciter for truth at a time.
Since no time is ever uniquely and objectively present, it makes no sense to
ask what just is true, simpliciter. Rather one must index truth to times.
Such times are ordered in a tenseless B-series, not in an A-series, for if
times are tensed, then there is a time which is simply present and propositions true at this time are simply true. Just as serious actualists reject the
indexical account of actuality espoused by modal realists like David Lewis
in favor of an account according to which propositions are simply true
rather than merely true in W, so serious tensed time theorists reject an
indexical account of presentness in favor of an account according to which
propositions expressed by tensed sentences are simply true rather than
merely true at t. If time is tensed, then, as I said in my critique, a definition
of omniscience which takes account of the times at which propositions are
true will look, not like Wierenga's, but like Davis's definition
0": 5 is omniscient = df For all p, if pat t, then it is true at t that S
knows that p and does not believe -po
If Wierenga's definition is intended to preclude any propositions' being
simply true, then he will have preserved divine omniscience only at the
expense of denying the tensed theory of time. In that case, the second
strategy proves no more successful in defending the coherence of divine
timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory of time than the first
strategy. Like Kvanvig/ Wierenga turns out to be no A-theorist either!

Talbot School of Theology
LaMirada, California
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NOTES
1. Edward Wierenga, "Omniscience and Time, One More Time: A Reply
to Craig," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 1 (January 2004); in response to
William Lane Craig, "Omniscience, Tensed Facts, and Divine Eternity," Faith
and Philosophy 17 (2000): 225-241.
2. See my trilogy on God and the nature of time: The Tensed Theory of
Time: A Critical Examination, Synthese Library 293 (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2000); The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination,
Synthese Library 294 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); God,
Time, and Eternity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001).
3. Consider, for example, my charge that Wierenga fails to give a plausible account of our beliefs de praesenti. Any such account must explain our
belief states and the cognitive significance which grasped propositional content
has for us. In his reply Wierenga, however, explains, "my proposal is about
the propositional content of belief, where that is understood as concerning the
propo:;itions that are believed." This is, in effect, to concede my point, for an
account of the propositional content of our beliefs does nothing to explain the
cognitive significance our beliefs de praesenti have for us. My remarks on the
analogy between our beliefs de se (expressed by personal indexicals) and our
beliefs de praesenti (expressed by temporal indexicals) are aimed at Wierenga's
account as an account of our belief states, not of the propositional content of
our beliefs.
4. Wierenga rightly points out that his definition of omniscience does not
restrict God's knowledge to tenseless truths. But I plead innocent to his charge
that I have misunderstood him here, for when I say, "In Wierenga's view God
has knowledge of propositions stating exclusively tense less B-facts," I mean by
"Wierenga's view" his view of God, not his definition of omniscience.
5. Wierenga does present two independent arguments to motivate his
revised definition, both of them arguments from analogy: (i) Omniscience is
analogous to omnipotence, which is properly restricted in certain ways. I find
this argument to be very weak, however. For the reason omnipotence is suitably circumscribed is that the bald claim that omnipotence means the ability to
do anything (universal possibilism) is incoherent, whereas the standard definition (If omniscience (0) is not. In any case an acceptable definition of omnipotence places no non-logical limit on God's power, as Wierenga's definition
does on omniscience. (ii) Knowledge of tensed facts is analogous to knowledge of personal facts, which are appropriately indexed. This is the best argument for Wierenga's redefinition, for there does seem to be a tight analogy
between facts expressed by personal and temporal indexicals (as opposed to
spatial indexicals, since there are no objective spatial "tenses"). But this analogy could at most motivate (though it would not require) treating personal and
temporal indexicals alike; it would not motivate Wierenga's way of doing so.
To avoid the charge that his definition is ad hoc, he would have to show that
competing analyses of such indexicals are less plausible than his account. Still,
Wierenga could claim that his account of the objects of knowledge offers at
least one plausible solution to the problem posed by indexical words, so that
his solution is open to the defender of divine timelessness without being ad hoc.
But I doubt that his account does provide a plausible solution. For indexing is
a way of eliminating, not preserving, perspectival content. When it is claimed
that "Chicago is here" is true at location l, the idea is that the propositional content c-f that sentence is spatially neutral but is truly expressed perspectivally by
someone at 1. In the same way, indexing personal and temporal indexical sentence3 to persons and times would eliminate private propositions and truth-

WIERENGA NO A-THEORIST EITHER

109

variable propositions. But Wierenga clearly understands his account to preserve perspectival propositional content, for he provides as examples of such
propositions I am sitting and It is sunny now. Thus, Wierenga's account seems
to be incoherent. (If one does advocate a view according to which propositions
are both personally neutral and tenseless, then my remarks on pp. 235-236 of
my original article become relevant.)
6. See William Lane Craig, "Kvanvig No A-Theorist," Faith and Philosophy
18 (2001): 377-380.

